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THE DISCOVERY OF PRISON REFORM
FRED COHEN *

A

sure sign of a movement in law is the volume and length of
judicial opinions and law review writing.' This Symposium
itself is exceptionally good evidence that prison reform has arrived. Only a few years ago it was accurate to state that the volume
and variety of legal claims made by prisoners-indeed, by offenders
located throughout the correctional process-was greatly increasing, although losses far outnumbered wins.
Today, the volume and variety of prisoner litigation continues to grow but now prisoners are beginning to win more often
and some of these victories must be regarded as important. 2 These
ostensible gains in litigation are matched by legislative debate, if
not affirmative action, the emergence of new publications dealing
with prisoners, new organizations, the inevitable conferences and
a growing political consciousness among inmates.3
It shall not be my purpose to deflate the significance of prisoner litigation or the overall prison reform movement. 4 Indeed,
it is out of a concern for basic change in prisons-in the entire
correctional process-that I shall approach some of the recent decisions by offering more questions than applause and by looking
to the future instead of expressing satisfaction with the present.
* Professor of Law and Criminal Justice, School of Criminal Justice, State University
of New York at Albany. B.S., 1957; LL.B., Temple University, 1960; LL.M., Yale University,
1961.
1. See, e.g., R. SINGER, PRisoNERs' LEGAL RIGHTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CASES AND ARTICLES
(1972).
2. Of particular interest are those decisions recognizing an inmate's right to procedural
due process in disciplinary proceedings, outlawing some disciplinary measures, taking cognizance of the emergence of Miranda claims and the expansion of first amendment rights.
3. See, e.g., the discussion of recent legislation in 1 PRISONERS' RiGHTs NEWsLETrER 17
(Sept. 1971) which is a new publication in the area of correction law; THE PRISON LAW
REP. (Administration of Criminal Justice and Prison Reform Committee of Young Lawyers
Section of the American Bar Assoc., Oct., 1971) is another such publication. Recent conferences on prisons and prison reforms include the National Corrections Conference (Williamsburg, Va., Dec. 6, 1971) and the National Conference on Prisoner's Rights (Chicago,
Ill., Nov. 5-7, 1971) sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Foundation, The Committee
for Public Justice, and The Playboy Foundation.
4. One writer actually states that the proliferation of inmate litigation "is responsible
both directly and indirectly for many disciplinary problems in prisons." M. Feit, Prison
Discipline and the Inmate Sense of Injustice chs. XII, XIII, 1971 (unpublished master's
essay in State Univ. of New York at Albany, School of Criminal Justice).
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As the prison reform movement gathers adherents and momentum, it appears to be acquiring its own sense of righteousness. 5 The appeal-particularly after a tragedy as monumental as
Attica-is irresistible. Persons who are desperate for help as well
as those who are desperate to help are not easily distracted by such
matters as an inventory of gains and an assessment of goals or questions concerning whether or not the tactics and strategy adopted
will further or retard agreed upon goals. Men are not led into
battle with cries for restraint or pleas for more research nor by
conceptual inquiries and the necessity of working out carefully
considered alternatives to incarceration.
Nor do I propose that they should be. As Leslie Wilkins has
stated, changes occur most quickly and obviously not as a logical
response to research findings, but as a result of riots, concern over
costs, as a humanitarian response to a lowered tolerance of degrading and brutalizing conditions and to increased awareness of
the extent of deprivations of civil liberties. As the post-Attica
experience in New York unfolds, it is clear that those who control and guide the direction of change are not the inmates who
created its possibility. The question, of course, should be the nature and direction of change and the initial battle should be waged
over objectives. What is likely to occur, however, is that the tactics of reform will become confused with objectives and the questions to be asked will be framed in such a way that while the
answer is clear, the possibility of achieving desirable change will
remain problematic.
The experiences gained during the sixties should teach us
that social movements are short-lived and too easily co-opted. For
example, the student rights movement unquestionably brought
some changes to the campus although the precise dimensions are
unknown. The calm which now pervades the campus hardly represents broad satisfaction with the outcome of the movement.
Rather, it appears to be bounded by a tight labor market and
5. An aspect of this righteousness is the way prisoners are being romanticized and
treated as though the term describes a single, homogeneous group. Malcolm Braly, who has
spent years in prison, states: "Convicts are the new vogue because they least appear to bring
some active focus to a revolution that is growing increasingly sluggish. And convicts, starved
as they are for identity, are going to play along with it to the hilt." Braly, The Men Behind
Bars: In and Out of Vogue, The Village Voice, Jan. 27, 1972, at 34, col. 3.
6. Wilkins, Variety, Conformity, Control and Research: Some Dilemmas of Social Defense, 28 INT'L REv. OF Caum. PoucOy 18 (1970).
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fuelled by bewilderment and frustration. What faculty member
has not witnessed a student group win the right to participate in
decision-making only to relinquish the hard won right by nonattendance? That the explanation for apparent apathy is the realization that the concession was more symbolic than real serves
only to underscore the theme of this article.
As the current prison reform movement approaches adolescence, it seems appropriate to explore the inherent limitations
and dangers of some of the strategy being employed-litigation in
particular-and to invite an assessment of gains and losses. A judicial opinion is not self-executing and thus it is time to inquire
about the implementation of legal victories. No one who is familiar with correctional administrators believes that a courtroom
victory for an inmate is followed by a staff meeting on how best to
implement the letter and spirit of the decision. Indeed, it is far
more likely that the meeting will involve the problem of how to
avoid the ruling or achieve minimal compliance.
I.

THE CREATION OF FAILURE

Prisons are so widely viewed as failures that it is difficult to
find informed spokesmen to speak on their behalf. Among the
critics are Chief Justice Burger, who recently said that it takes but
a single visit to a prison to acquire a zeal for prison reform; President Nixon, quoted as saying, "The American system for correcting and rehabilitating criminals presents a convincing case of
failure;" and former Attorney General Mitchell, who was "appalled
at the situation in many of our prisons today." 7 The consensus
on prison failure has never been greater, the sense of despair
never deeper. Attica is stark testimony to the fact that many men
were willing to die rather than live in a situation that had become
intolerable. Do the prisoners and guards at Attica become so many
dead bodies or the first to fall in the beginning of a movement that
sweeps clean our moribund prison system? How many Atticas will
be required first to humanize the system and then to adopt alternatives to incarceration for the vast majority of offenders?
In the rush to engage the prison it seems appropriate to men7. Address by former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, National Corrections Conference, Williamsburg, Va., Dec. 6, 1971.
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tion that the penitentiary has not always been with us and that it
was not born out of despair.8 In the late eighteenth century jails
were constructed in the belief that local control of crime was not
adequate and on the principle that punishments must be certain
but humane.' By the 1820's, the faith of the 1790's seemed misplaced. Experts sought the causes of crime in the lives of those
who were incarcerated. 10 Cause, it came to be believed, could always be traced to some traumatic event during childhood and thus
criminality was determined to begin with the family.
Once the seeds of criminality were sown, the community presented all the necessary ingredients for a life of crime-liquor,
theaters, and bawdy houses were constant temptations. The urgent need to construct a special and well organized world, one
that insulated the deviant from the corrupting influences of the
community, seemed eminently sensible. As always, the diagnosis
contained the cure, although leaders in the Jacksonian era faced a
dilemma which continues to haunt us. If the causes of crime were
to be found in the community then is it more expedient to alter
the community or alter the individual's relationship to the community?
The answer then, as now, was the penitentiary-a place that
would, be uniquely American and become a showplace for the
world. Prisoners would be totally isolated from the external community and from each other. In Philadelphia, the doctrine of
silence and isolation was carried to the point that officials placed
a hood over the head of a new prisoner while escorting him to his
solitary cell so he could not see or be seen by other inmates.11
These notions, of course, were consistent with the prevailing
diagnosis. Punishment, in the sense of the gratuitous infliction of
pain, was not an objective.
As is well known, the'Auburn and Pennsylvania Plans for
isolation and silence quickly degenerated. Guards even came to
8. The discussion in notes 9-16, infra is substantially from D. ROTHMAN, THE DisCOvERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC chs. 8 8 A (1971)
which is the best history available on the development of the penitentiary as well as other
institutions.
9. This represented the triumph of the beliefs set forth in C. BECCARRIA, ON CRIMES
AND PUNISHMENTS xi (H. Paolucci transl. 1963) (known in the colonies as early as 1770).

10. This methodological error is repeated to this day.
11. See E. LIVINGSTON, INTRODUCTORY REPORT TO THE CODE OF PRISON DISCIPLINE 5rl
(1827). Livingston would later be acclaimed for the penal code he drafted for Louisiana
which, among other things, was notable for the solicitude shown the offender.
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bribe prisoners to achieve compliance. New York, for example,
was committed to obedience at any cost. The prisoner must submit and the ball and chain as well as whippings certainly were in
order-not to punish-to achieve submission to authority. The
military model, which persists today, became increasingly attractive and no one could doubt who were the enlisted men and who
were the officers.
With the emergence of the Auburn and Pennsylvania Plans
in the Jacksonian era, institutionalization had become the choice
of first resort. What is important in this brief historical sketch is
that confinement was not originally conceived as punishment but
as a necessary ingredient of cure. The construction of the fortress
penitentiary and the removal of the offender from the community
flowed directly from the diagnosis of criminality. In the zeal to
achieve reform, who could fault the early leaders if they failed to
consider what might be done with fixed solutions should there be
a change in the popular beliefs on the causes of criminality?
If there is one constant factor in the contemporary search for
the causes of crime, it is the diversity of methodology, beliefs and
theories.' 2 Criminology has reached the point where two distinguished scholars now say,
[T]he attempt to establish all-embracing theories of criminal behavior-themes that in one formulation include explanations of

incest, shoplifting, malicious mischief, gambling, burglary and antitrust violations-has tended to produce statements that either are

so general that they are applicable with only slight alterations as
explanations of all human behavior, criminal and noncriminal, or

so tautological that there [sic] are merely extended definitions of
the behavior they seek to explain.' 3
In the same vein, Leon Radzinowicz suggests that the most that
of factors or circan be done is to throw light on the combination
4
cumstances that can be associated with crime.
Thus, the fortress prison has far outlived its original rationale and its survival is dependent on post hoc rationalizations
that rarely comport with acceptable (i.e., contemporary) notions
of criminality. Indeed, a study of some of the major prisoners'
12. For an excellent summary, see M. WOLFGANG & F. FERRACUT7, THE SUBCULTURE OF
VIOLENCE: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY IN CRIMINOLOGY ch. II (1967).
13. H. BLOCH & G. GEIs, MAN, CRIME AND Socl-ry 81 (1st ed. 1970).
14. See generally L. RADZINOWICZ, IN SEACH OF CRIMINOLOGY (1961).
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rights decisions discloses that administrators uniformly contendand even the most progressive courts uniformly accept-that security and good order are primary institutional objectives. 0 Such
a proposition is urged and accepted without dissent and apparently without the realization that what originally was a secondary
consideration incident to the pursuit of cure has been converted
into a primary rationale both for the continuation of the prison
and the deprivation of numerous rights.' 6

II.

THE EVOLUTION OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS

Prisoners never have been without any legal rights. Aside
from any constitutional or statutory requirements, our courts have
held that prison authorities must keep their prisoners free from
harm and provide the basic necessities of life: medical care, clothing, shelter, and food. Thus, even without the current embellishments, prison authorities are under a duty to maintain the
minimal conditions necessary to sustain life and health.'7
The key word in the above sentence is minimal. For example, in 1963 a prisoner at the Utah State Prison complained about
the quality and quantity of food provided him in the maximum
security wing of the prison. He received two meals a day in rather
small portions and complained that the service was unsanitary and
the food always cold when served. More basically, the prisoner
testified that he always felt hunger pangs. The court relied on the
testimony of the prison doctor to the effect that since there had
not been a case of malnutrition in at least five years and hunger
pangs are necessarily subjective, the claim must be dismissed.' 8
In Holt v. Sarver,9 Judge Henley described the Arkansas
prison fare as neither appetizing nor attractive, but nonetheless
wholesome. The "grue" which was served consisted of meat, potatoes, vegetables, eggs, oleo, syrup and seasoning all baked to15. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200 (2d Cir. 1971) where discipline and
good order are held to be suffident interests to justify regulation of a prisoner's mail.
16. A writer who is also an active and successful litigator on behalf of prisoners
appears to accept security as a penological goal and concedes that prison administrators
are the best judges of how to achieve it. Millemann, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and
ProceduralDue Process-The Requirement of a Full Administrative Hearing, 31 MD. L.
REv. 27, 49 (1971).
17. F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CoRREcrIONS 66 (1969).
18. Hughes v. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 128, 378 P.2d 888 (1963).
19. 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).

PRISON REFORM

gether in a pan and served in four inch squares. The judge found
that there had been occasions where the food was tainted by dogs
or birds but concluded that none of the petitioners appeared to
be suffering from malnutrition.20
Still more recently, a federal judge reviewed the use of a
bread and water diet in the Virginia penitentiary system. The
judge found that the 700 calories provided were intended to physically debilitate the prisoner and as such constituted a prolonged
sort of corporal punishment forbidden as cruel and unusual pun21
ishment under the eighth amendment.
I refer to these cases-separated by eight years yet spanning
the era of increasing prisoners' rights litigation-to illustrate just
how minimal a prisoner's rights are and to indicate the protracted
period invariably required first to accept the existence of a right,
then to give it substance and scope and finally to implement it.
What is minimally required for human survival (in the
physical sense) has now become the foundation for increasingly
sophisticated claims by prisoners and their lawyers. However one
may ultimately assess the actual gains of prisoner litigation, one
point is abundantly dear: an educational process has occurred.
When the opinions written in some of the more recent cases are
compared with opinions written only a few years ago, the difference in technique, content, and principle is startling.2 2 Whether
or not this increase in judicial sophistication has trickled down
to prison officials and line officers is quite another matter.
What might be termed the second era of prisoners' rights is
characterized by the emergence of moderately successful litigation
and encompasses three major areas each with subsidiary spinoffs: 1 1) access to the courts, including communication with
legal counsel and access to legal materials; 24 2) religious free-

20. Id. at 832.
21. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). A bread and water diet

thus joins the use of corporal punishment (the strap) as punishment forbidden by the
eighth amendment. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
22. Compare Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961) with Landman v.
Royster, 833 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
23. See F. COHEN, supra note 17, at 67-76. For a more recent and comprehensive account, see Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 175

(1970).
24. The high point in this area recently was reached in Lynch v. Gilmore, 400 F.2d
228 (9th Cir. 1968), aff'd, 401 U.S. 906 (1971). See 21 BuFFAo L. REv. 987 (1972).
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dom; 25 and 3) the proscription of cruel and unusual punishments.
One way to describe the above three areas is a judicially
recognized and (hopefully) enforced alteration of the prior status
of the prisoner. The earlier legal status of prisoner was scarcely
recognizable as the equivalent of human status. Any Humane
Society would claim that domestic animals have at least the right
to the sort of minimal care and protection that allowed for survival. Prisoners were hardly afforded any more. Indeed, with a
cognitive and experiential apparatus not shared by other animals,
denial of the right to minimal psychic integrity placed the humanturned-prisoner in a more deprived status than a dog or a cat.
Without wishing to appear to make excessive claims for the
advances of the second era, the enlargement of prisoner status is
not without significance. To hold, for example, that a prisoner
must be guaranteed reasonable access to the courts, that he must
suffer no reprisals for his efforts, and that there is a right to some
2
form of assistance, recognizes the prisoner as a jural entity. "
According a prisoner the absolute right to freedom of religious belief is as pious a proposition as the solemn statement
that we all have this freedom. Obviously, what matters is the way
in which our beliefs may be exercised, particularly if those beliefs
deviate from the conventional. As is well known by now, it is the
Black Muslims who have fleshed ot the law in this area.2 7 The
consequent side effect of the recognition of a limited right to the
free exercise of religion is the addition of yet another affirmative
dimension to the status of the prisoner. To have accomplished
this in the context of a religion that includes political and racial
beliefs not likely to accord with the views of judges or, certainly,
the typical pris6n official, is all the more important.
The constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishments--whether from fellow prisoners or prison employees
-can be said to be simply a restatement of the right to physical
25. This is not to slight racial segregation, see Lee v. Washington, 890 US. 833 (1968)
(per curiam), not the critical problems of racial tensions in prisons. The three areas described in the text represent volume vis-&-vis implications of significance.
26. The right of access now is so clear that courts hardly pause to debate the proposi.
tion. See, e.g., Levier v. Woodson, 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971).
27. On the special dietary needs of Muslims, see Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995,
1001-03 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Black Muslims are sometimes referred to as the Jehovah's
Witnesses of penal litigation.
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survival which, as I previously noted, always had been the rule.
However, elevating the proposition to one of constitutional dimension serves the additional function of assuring federal jurisdiction and thus, generally, a more receptive forum than most
state courts.28 Even here, enthusiasm for doctrinal enlargement
should be tempered by an effort to assess actual results.
The concentration camp conditions in the Arkansas State
Penitentiary system eventuated in a finding that the system as it
then existed was unconstitutional. Holt v. Sarver involved the
first judicial attack on an entire system and demonstrated the
value of a class action as opposed to an individual lawsuit. 29 Conditions in Arkansas were so debased that the federal district judge
found that a sentence of imprisonment amounted to banishment
from civilized society to a world where human life and the most
elemental of human decencies ceased to exist.
Despite the shocking dimensions of the cruelty and inhumanity of the Arkansas situation, the relief actually afforded seems
pale by comparison. For example, the court found the isolation
cells to be in very poor condition and even rat infested but since
the overcrowding had been relieved, the court was reluctant to
interfere with their continued use.30 The disrepair of some of
these cells was laid to incorrigible prisoners without a hint of
recognition that the system previously described could easily lead
any man to foul his cage. 1
In sum, while the judicial treatment of the Arkansas system
must be characterized as an advance-both in procedural and substantive terms-the situation there was shown to be so far beyond
redemption that any remedy short of a total injunction on the use
of the facilities would itself be cruelly disproportionate to the.
findings. The result is reminiscent of much discussion that immediately followed the Attica uprising: conditions are not goo&
and must be changed but, of course, change takes time. Those who
must suffer while the debate continues are, of course, the prisoners.
28. For a discussion of state court receptivity to prisoners' daims, see generally
Schwartz, A Comment on Sostre v. McGinnis, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 775 (1972).
29. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E3D. Ark. 1970). The superintendent of the.
Tucker State Prison Farm subsequently was indicted for the inhumane treatment of inmates. He was acquitted as were five other Arkansas officials who had previously been indicted. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1969, at 32, col. 1.
30. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 378.

31.

Id.
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We are now well into a new era of prisoners' rights litigation. The issues are changing, although they are logically connected to the claims of the prior eras, and the clients are changing
-they are scarcely recognizable. It is not possible to accurately
measure the extent to which prior litigation has contributed to
the current discovery and popularity of prison reform, but it
would be difficult not to accord it a major role. In my own experience in visiting and talking with numerous inmates (adult
and juvenile) and parolees, there can be no doubt that their selfimage has been dramatically altered. Where two or three years
ago the questions asked of me would be almost exclusively concerned with defects in the conviction or, with regard to prison
conditions, loss of good time and the vagaries of detainers, now
the discussion focuses on rights-the right to a fair parole hearing; the right to gain access to the ubiquitous file; the right to
privacy; the right to political and labor organization; the right to
be free of physical brutality as well as psychic terror; the right to
procedural fairness; the right to "read anything I damn please"to be free of "the man." The offender has come to realize that
for all practical purposes his immediate relief is not in the
hands of the executive or the legislature or-with distressingly
few exceptions-correctional administrators. Advances that are
not attributed to prison rebellions seem most closely linked to
successful litigation.3 2 That this may prove to be dangerously
romantic and disillusioning is the one point that I hope remains
with the reader.
Samuel Jordan, writing while confined in prison, carries the
point far beyond reform through litigation and raises distressing
questions about the totality of reform.33 He characterizes reformers either as humanist, realist, or streamliner. While differing in technique and analysis, their single objective, according to
Jordan, is to make prison work. 4 For him, the future is the prisoner and the prisoners' struggle can be understood and resolved
82. Of course there is another view of the role of lawyers and litigation. An extreme
view is that of Moe Comancho, President, California Correctional Officers Association. In
testimony, he concluded that prison violence is an outgrowth of revolutionary recruitment
and agitation most commonly occurring through inmate contact with lawyers. Hearings
Before Subcommittee No. 3 on Corrections of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 15, pt. II, at 58 (1971).
83. Jordan, PrisonReform: In Whose Interest?,7 Ciumr. L. BULL. 779 (1971).
34. Id. at 786.
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only within the context of the "urge to freedom on the part of
Black and working-class people." 35 The unwillingness and inability of courts to participate in an alteration of the racial and
class structure of prisons is painfully obvious. It remains to be
seen whether the ostensible gaifls achieved through litigation
serve to advance or retard the effort to deal with prisons as the
most flagrant example of the race-class bias which pervades the
entire criminal justice system.
The discovery of prisoners' grievances by legal writers is a
fairly recent phenomenon. It is only recently that there have been
reported decisions of sufficient quantity to allow for an inventory
and analysis of the issues. With legislation in this area practically
nonexistent, it is understandable that the initial focus was on
what courts have done and what they might do. With the courts
as the only faintly responsive organ of government, it was inevitable that prisoners and their lawyers would direct their attention
to change through litigation. Although the adoption of an adversary model-change through procedural due process-may not
have been inevitable, it was the handiest analogue for many problems. Lawyers argued for individual relief and system change on
the basis of rights that, once extended, would somehow dent the
total control exercised by prison officials. Writers like Samuel
Jordan had not yet been heard from and suggestions that "some
items in the due process grab-bag are relied on more as articles of
faith than as documented solutions" went unheeded.3 6
The objectives of the second era of prisoners' rights to a large
extent remain unrealized and, while not often articulated, continue to be the basis of much litigation. The prison community is
viewed-and accurately so-as a lawless enterprise lacking in substantive and procedural safeguards3 7 The ease with which prisoners can be manipulated and abused led naturally to call for
visibility and accountability, for reliability in fact-finding and
rationality in conclusions, for an end to physical abuse and for
some limitation on the total discretion exercised by those in authority.
35. Id.
36. See F. COHEN, supra note 17, at 106.
37. See generally Greenberg & Stender, The Prison As a Lawless Agency, 21 BUFFALo
L. Rnv. 799 (1972).
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These must be viewed as the minimal objectives of prison
reform through legal devices. They are desirable regardless of the
correctional philosophy employed and regardless of an institution's ranking on the basic decency scale. In pursuit of these
objectives, reformers should be aware of the complexities of translating an appellate decision into operational reality and the
distinction between gaining a specific procedural right and the
realization of a larger objective. One need only look to the efforts of the Warren Court to trace the source of this point.
Looking past the prisoners' rights area for a moment there
can be little disagreement with the observation that the so-called
Due Process Revolution hammered out by the Warren Court is
over. There unquestionably were real gains in the almost total incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the fleshing out of additional
8
content to apply as well to the states as the federal system.

If

the decisions, in toto, turn out to be doctrinally weak and operationally suspect, then at least there is the symbolic victory. Now
that we have Winship, Benton, Duncan, Klopfer, Gault, Pointer,
Malloy, Gideon, Ker, Mapp, Robinson 30 and the like are we
able to say that there is now basic change in the criminal justice
system? Has Miranda actually brought the constitution to the
gatehouse? Has Gault revolutionized the juvenile justice system? 40 If the answer is no-even a halting, uncertain, we-needmore-studies-type no-can we comfortably expect that the
reform-by-analogy approach in the prisoners' rights area will escape the fate of the pretrial and trial phases of the system as well
as the parallel juvenile justice system?
As Professor Amsterdam shows so well, the advances made by
the Warren Court did more to create the possibility and appear-

38. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), holding that 12 man juries are not constitutionally required in state criminal proceedings, is an example of the dilution of a
federal rule previously viewed as "untouchable." Incorporation followed by interpretation
rarely has produced this sort of dilution by renvoi.
39. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
40. One study found that juveniles with counsel are more likely to be incarcerated
than juveniles without counsel. Duffee & Siegel, The Organization Alan: Legal Counsel in
the Juvenile Court, 7 CaR,. L. BULL. 544, 552 (1971).

866
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ance of rights than actual rights. 41 The totality of decisions that
make up the Due Process Revolution-obviously, some more than
others-turn out to be conceptually flabby and operationally imperfect. Where the accused must be informed before he can act
against self-interest, the waiver doctrine is a handy escape provision. If the police do err, then the doctrine of harmless error is
available and growing in popularity The complexities and safeguards of search and seizure law are "ameliorated" by finding
apartment doors open and contraband in plain view or in being
fortunate enough to observe a suspect "drop" something to the
ground which on inspection happily appears to be a narcotic
drug.42 At another level, the broadside attacks on law enforcement by the Warren Court-the distrust of power and doubts as
to competence and worthiness of objectives-have ironically resulted in the broadest political and economic support enjoyed by
the police in generations.
This is not the occasion to grapple with the complexities of
due process nor to give detailed attention to each of the particular
areas encompassed by that sweeping term. My effort is cautionary
43
and my impressions far exceed the data.
By focusing on the efforts of the judiciary, the Supreme Court
in particular, to achieve change through constitutionally imposed
safeguards, three distinct but overlapping points may be made.
First, the failure of doctrinal change to achieve either operational
or system change is clear. Second, there is the reminder of the
inherent limitations on the judiciary's willingness and ability to
control practices at the operational level. In the same way that

41. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases,
45 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 785, 803 (1970).
42. Martin Garbus, a New York City attorney, tells me that, based on police testimony in drug cases, it appears that every apartment door in Harlem is open and that
nearly anyone in New York carrying drugs automatically drops it at the first sight of
a police officer. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
Ci. L. Rv. 665, 754-57 (1970).
43. For example, I would not argue with the point that the right to counsel has
been generally more beneficial to defendants than Miranda has been to suspects. Even
with counsel, however, there are doubts. In an exhaustive study of the Boston lower court
system, it was shown how the right to counsel is used to manipulate pleas through
waiver, promises of leniency and rapid processing. The statistics demonstrated that defendants without lawyers did receive more lenient sentences. See Bing & Rosenfeld, The Quality of justice: In the Lower Criminal Courts of Metropolitan Boston, 7 CraM. L. BULL.
393, 423 (1971).
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the Warren Court dealt primarily with police-prosecution practices (vis h vis laws and regulations), courts dealing with prisoners' cases find that in the absence of written law and regulations
they must deal with specific practices. The low level of visibility
in police decision-making is replicated and exceeded by the control asserted by officials over the conduct of prison affairs. A court
may find itself drafting a code of regulations in the genre of a
Miranda opinion, but will that court, even if it is much closer to
the scene, be in any better position than the distant Supreme
Court to assure compliance? 44 Third, there is the problem of
change by analogy. The existence of "a problem" often is shown
merely by demonstrating that a certain rule applies in one area
but not in another. Once it is shown, for example, that the right
to counsel is critical at trial, by a parity of reasoning it can be
shown that where counsel may not be required-say at interrogation or sentencing-there is a problem. The statement of the
problem-typically in analogical form-carries with it the answer.
Reasoning and argument by analogy is, of course, not unique
to the legal profession. However, in fashioning litigation-particularly when the case involves a challenge to an existing practice
-lawyers seem umbilically tied to the use of analogy. In the prisoners' rights area-indeed, in the entire correctional area-one of
the dominant approaches can be reduced to a syllogistic type
statement: Process A is virtually identical to process B. Process A
requires an X while process B does not. Therefore process B
45
should have an X.

The trap of excessive reliance on analogy is the limitation it
imposes on the development of more creative solutions to the
problem and the apparent tendency to accept on faith the inher-

44. As will be discussed, several lower courts recently have sought to impose detailed
regulations on prison systems and in the framework of a declaratory judgment-injunctive
process maintained jurisdiction for the purpose of assuring compliance.
45. X's may be counsel, notice, an impartial tribunal, specificity in rules and the
like. The invested process (A) will be found by looking to virtually any situation-especially the pretrial and trial aspects of criminal law-where liberty or a "grievous loss"
are involved. Process B, the one found lacking, is found by looking at almost any aspect
of prison life and regulation.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), requiring the rudiments of procedural
due, process before welfare benefits may be terminated. Goldberg has now become a necessary citation in any effort to extend procedural due process to prisoners' grievances,
particularly those involving internal discipline.
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ent worth of the missing factor.46 In the prisoner area, more and

more courts are dealing with prisoners' grievances concerning
disciplinary procedures. On the one hand, the grievances are real
enough. Rules either are nonexistent or so vague as to be meaningless. The invocation and processing of alleged violations generally lacks even a semblance of procedural regularity.
Prisoners rightly complain about false charges, being accused
and adjudged by the same person, the denial of notice of charges,
and a fair opportunity to defend or explain before an impartial
tribunal, lack of legal assistance and dozens of other similar items.
If the automatic response to these grievances is the handiest analogue, once again the definition of the problem will be allowed
to create the solution. For example, is the problem the right to
legal counsel at disciplinary proceedings or is it better stated as
the inability of most prisoners to adequately prepare and represent themselves even if given the chance?
Should the problem be defined as a lack of legal counsel, then
the demand will be for counsel. It is exceedingly unlikely that
lawyers in sufficient numbers in reasonable proximity to outlying
institutions will ever be available. If assistance and representation
is the issue-and given the fact that the sixth amendment has not
yet been moved into disciplinary proceedings-perhaps the search
should be for a lay advocate or legal assistant-type program. Perhaps a better solution lies with a truly independent ombudsman
along with the type of labor negotiation model being experimented with in the District of Columbia.4 7
I have not selected the counsel issue and identified possible
options because this is the most vital issue or the possible options
the best solutions. The point is meant to be illustrative only and
to underscore the importance of being more precise in the definition of the problem and to urge escape from the trap of inade46. Consider the Alice-in-Wonderland faith and energy invested in the neutral and
detached magistrate and warrant process, and the primary reliance on the exclusionary
rule to alter police behavior. In the battle to control the police and bring a modicum of
fairness to defendants, the objective tended to be submerged and the handiest solution
adopted.
47. The Center for Correctional Justice, funded by OEO, contracts with other agencies for civil and criminal legal services for inmates. The Center's objectives are to negotiate binding agreements with institutional officials-indeed to do so with inmate
negotiating teams-before litigation and surely before the Attica boiling point is reached.
See Interview with Linda Singer, Attica: A Look at the Cause and the Future, in 7 CRIM.
L. BULL. 817, 839-43 (1971).
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quately defined problems which may promote unrealistic and
unworkable solutions.
III.

A NEw

ERA

At this point let us examine some of the very recent decisions that represent the beginning of the new era of prisoners'
rights. The basic framework for this exploration is the tactical
question that nags at many thoughtful lawyers who are engaged
in this reform movement: do you retard the reduction of prison
populations or even their eventual demise by winning such items
as the right to read Playboy, to exercise more frequently, to be
notified in writing of a disciplinary charge or to receive and send
uncensored mail? The answer given me by one active litigator .is
that he is not the one to tell a prospective inmate client that he
should remain in solitary until the revolution. Another perspective was provided by Richard Shoblad, a former inmate, who is
now organizing the National Prisoner's Alliance.
Mr. Shoblad recounted that he had recently attended a meeting on the West Coast called, as he said, by some radical groups.
The group quickly reached agreement that prisons must go at
which point Shoblad rose to ask what the plans were "for the guys
in the joint." One of the organizers jumped to his feet and proclaimed, "Some of them must be prepared to die."
Despite the urgency of providing relief to those who remain
incarcerated and the arrogance of those who are prepared to volunteer the lives of others, the initial question-and its assumptions about the validity of prisons-will not disappear. In dealing
with this dilemma George Bernard Shaw said:
Therefore, if any person is addressing himself to the perusal of this
dreadful subject in the spirit of a philanthropist bent on reforming a necessary and beneficent public institution, I beg him to put
it down and go about some other business. It is just such reformers
who have in the past made the neglect, oppression, corruption and
physical torture of the old common gaol the pretext for transforming it into the diabolical den
of torment, mischief, and damnation,
the modern model prison. 48
In October, 1971, United States District Judge Robert R.
Merhige, Jr. handed down a scathing 74 page decision in a class
48.

G.B. SHAW, THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT 13 (Philosophical Library ed. 1946).
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action filed against Virginia's top correctional officials. 4 Attorney Phil Hirschkop, in charge of the litigation, was quoted as
hailing the decision as "a bill of rights for inmates." 1o Landman v. Royster 51 does indeed represent the high water mark in
legal safeguards extended to prisoners who are alleged to have
violated prison rules.
The Virginia State Penitentiary System had not reached the
same depths of degradation as the Arkansas system, 2 yet the
practices found to exist on the basis of 10 days of testimony would
not be described as humane treatment by hard-working and wellintentioned correctional employees. Judge Merhige found that
the practices complained of were "not isolated deviations from
normal practice but rather indicated traditional procedures in
the state penal system." 53
Some of the punishments regularly employed in Virginia
consisted of a bread and water diet, which provided a daily intake
of 700 calories; placing an inmate in chains or handcuffs in his
cell-in one case chaining a prisoner who demanded medicine to
his cell bars with his neck taped against the bars for 14 hours;
taking away an inmate's clothing while in solitary and keeping
him in an unheated cell with open windows in the winter; crowding men into a single "solitary cell"; using tear gas to silence men
in their cells; extensive use of solitary confinement (266 days in
one case) for acting as a "jailhouse lawyer"; and the denial of
medical treatment.54 As uncivilized as these practices are, they
lack the full flavor of the Arkansas experience where the trustee
system allowed prisoners to beat and kill each other; where the
use of dormitories for sleeping encouraged nocturnal stabbings,
killings and homosexual rape; where officials demanded sexual
favors from the wives of inmates in return for some minor favor;
and where the "Tucker telephone" was used on an inmate's genitals to shock him into submission.
Landman's condemnation of the Virginia practices may not
be surprising. However, what is pleasantly surprising-in the
49. Much of the background for the case is contained in Hirschkop & Millemann, The
Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969).
50. NEwsWEEK, Nov. 15, 1971 at 39.
51. 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
52. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
53. 333 F. Supp. at 645.
54. This is a representative, not a complete, listing.
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sense that it is novel-is the effort by the court to articulate some
principles to assist in distinguishing sanctions that are constitutional from those that are unconstitutional and the linking of
those principles to procedural minima.
"Deprivations of benefits of various sorts may be used so long
as they are related to some valid penal objective and substantial
deprivations are administered with due process." 1 Judge Merhige cannot be seriously faulted for not clearly stating what constitutes a valid penal objective. He makes a decent start by
indicating that "security" or "rehabilitation" are not shibboleths
to justify any treatment, and by imposing on prison authorities,
when faced with a legal challenge, the obligation of showing a
(presumably reasonable) relationship between means and ends.'"
In a previous work, I struggled with a similar problem. My
suggestion then was: "In order to have a principle that separates
the housekeeping decision from the right determinative decision,
it is necessary to go beyond the suggestive metaphors. The principle suggested here is that the greater the impact on the conditions of present or prospective liberty, or the physical and psychic
integrity of the prisoner, the greater (or more plausible) the
claim to substantive and procedural safeguards." 67 As I read
Landman, it includes this principle and goes further by making
clear that sanctions are subject to both a rule of minimal decency-put in cruel and unusual punishment terms-and a rule of
rationality-put in reasonable relationship terms.
Should Landman survive appeal (or negotiations on the
order) and should it commend itself to other courts, it raises some
interesting possibilities. On the one hand, the opinion shows that
at least one judge is sensitive to the ease with which correctional
officials, aided by professional staff, can create their own reality
through verbal manipulation. By linking "security" and "rehabilitation," the court may not have foreclosed claims that what
appears to be punishment actually is treatment, but a predicate
is established to head off such efforts?5
55. Landman v. Royster, 883 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971).
56. Id. That the burden of justification is on prison officials may be a liberal reading of the opinion. However, in taking the opinion as a whole this seems to be a reasonable inference.
57. F. ComEN, supra note 17, at 78.
58. See McCray v. Maryland, Misc. Pet. 4363 (Md. Cir. Ct., Montgomery County,
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In relation to future projections about corrections, this becomes a most important point. For one thing, the corrections
community seems clearly committed to the notion of communitybased programs. 59 These programs, in turn, are couched in treatment-rehabilitation language and are insistent on high flexibility
in order to achieve their reintegrative aims. Within the concept
of high flexibility is the insistence on the power to quickly move
offenders in and out of programs as well as in and out of variably
secure facilities. The very existence of such programs is (and will
be) offered as proof of decency, rationality and good intentions,
and any effort to impose such "legalisms" as notice and a hearing
or specificity in rules and regulations regarded as the antithesis of
such programs. One court, in what is regarded as an enlightened
opinion, has already laid the groundwork for the future of correctional resistance. "[Corrections] has the right to transfer prisoners from one institution to another, whether to a higher, equal or
lower security status, for administrative, therapeutic, adjustment
or other reason, without the need for a hearing under these procedures." 60 The same court made it plain that a prisoner had no
right to remain in any particular institution and, by implication,
no right to in any way construct a case for admission to a particular program or setting.6
Returning to Landman, the court enjoined the practices previously described as violative of cruel and unusual punishment
and proceeded to deal with the procedural issues, making it plain
that the initial reluctance to do so was overcome by evidence that
innocent men repeatedly had been disciplined. The court utilized
the increasingly popular "balancing test" to determine what
process was due. That due process was required never was seriously in doubt. On the one side is the individual's interest in
avoiding sanctions which, though presumably constitutionalsolitary confinement, denial of good time credits, "padlocking"
Nov. 11, 1971). Here the legal challenge was directed at Pautuxent Institution and the
Defective Delinquent Act of Maryland. Pautuxent was established as a diagnostic and
treatment facility for offenders who seem most in need of treatment. Its failures and
cruelties are reviewed in this opinion and in the face of a defense that relied on the
institution's treatment objectives.
59. See, e.g.. Conrad. Introduction, 381 ANNAIS xii (1969). This article introduces a
symposium exploring the future of corrections.
60. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 173 (D. Md. 1971).
61. Id.; accord,Clutchette v. Procunier, 828 F. Supp. 767, 780 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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in a cell, and maximum security confinement-nonetheless constitute severe punishment. On the other side, the court identifies
the legitimate prison functions of discipline, speed in punishing
misbehavior and the sidetracking of administrators from nondisciplinary duties.2
Landman clearly strikes the balance in favor of procedural
due process for the inmate. In so doing, the court divides infractions into major and minor categories, the former encompassing
the utilization of any solitary confinement, transfer to maximum
security confinement, loss of good time or padlock confinement
in excess of ten days.6
For major infractions, due process requires an impartial
tribunal (i.e., preclusion of the official who reports the violation), a hearing (i.e., the right to present evidence and voluntary
witnesses), written notice, reasonable time to prepare (no minimal time stated), confrontation and cross-examination of adverse
witnesses and a decision based on evidence in the record. No
appellate procedure was required and, though plainly troubled
by this, the court would not extend the right to appointed counsel but did (where substantial sanctions are possible) allow the
appearance of retained counsel as well as a minimum of four days
postponement in order to secure counsel.6 4 Inmates are to be
permitted to be represented by lay advisors, either a fellow in65
mate or a member of the noncustodial staff.
Minor infractions, such as those which may carry small fines,
loss of commissary rights, restriction of recreational privileges or
padlocking for less than ten days can be treated in more summary
fashion. For these infractions the court would require only verbal
notice and the opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal, with a chance to confront and cross-examine the complaining
officer and to present testimony in defense.
Compared to other recent decisions, Landman reads like a
Magna Carta. For example, in Bundy v. Cannon, United States
District Judge Thomsen found that the Maryland Penitentiary
System systematically imposed severe sanctions on inmates with62. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. at 644.
63. Id. at 654.
64. Id.
65.

Id.
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out the semblance of procedural regularity. 66 He too recognized
a need to divide major and minor infractions for the purpose of
determining what process is due.6 7 Yet, the relief afforded in
Bundy, representing a form of consent decree between opposing
counsel, falls short of that extended in Landman. For example,
major violations are those which may incur a sentence (and the
word "sentence" is used) of confinement in excess of fifteen days
or a loss of good time in excess of five days. The decision as to
what constitutes a major or minor violation appears to be exclu-

sively in the hands of the Adjustment Team-the euphemism for
the disciplinary tribunal. Violations are not categorized in advance and thus the criteria for the decision must be based on the
sanction that may be imposed. That this process is circular is
apparent and the invitation to predetermine the matter is, of
course, transparent.
A Maryland inmate is given the right to lay representation,
written notice of the charge and at least 48 hours to prepare; the
right to call one or more witnesses if the Team determines it is
practical; the right to cross-examine witnesses who testify if the
Team deems it relevant and the Team's decision must be based
on substantial evidence and is to include a summary of the evidence."" The inmate's rights, such as they are, are not to be unreasonably withheld or restricted by the Team. Provision is made
for a hearing officer from the office of the Commissioner of Correction, although it is only as of this writing that funds'have'been
allocated for that purpose. It appears that the hearing officers will
be employed by the Department and are likely to be composed
mainly of former correction officers.
The Bundy decision clearly leaves a vast amount of discretion with correctional officials. Indeed, by admonishing the Adjustment Team to not unreasonably withhold or restrict the
minimal procedural rights extended, the court tacitly permits
the "reasonable" denial of all rights excepting perhaps notice
and some form of hearing.
66. 328 F. Supp. 165, 173 (D. Md. 1971).
67. "The protracted segregated confinement in maximum security quarters and/or
the loss of 'good time' . . . constitute punishment sufficiently severe to require minimum
due process safeguards." Id.

68. In requiring substantial evidence, Bundy may actually exceed Landman. However,
the difference may be more apparent than real given the ease with which the requirement
may be met with verbal manipulation.
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In Clutchette v. Procunier,9 the federal district court also
was confronted with a constitutional challenge to disciplinary procedures. United States District Judge Zirpoli rejected the argument that the Department of Corrections had complete discretion
over the confinement of a prisoner subject only to the proscriptions of the cruel and unusual punishment clause and California
statutes.7 Proceeding on the "grievous loss" theory of Goldberg
v. Kelley7 1 the court aligned itself with Landman and Bundy in
recognizing the double-deprivation aspect of imprisonment-that
is, it recognized that the use of walls-within-walls, and the extension and consequent deprivation of certain amenities while confined cannot be left to the whims of correctional personnel. For
serious punishments, Clutchette requires notice, the right to call
witnesses, confrontation and cross-examination, the use of a counsel-substitute or legal counsel if the case will be referred for
prosecution, a decision based on the evidence, and a decision by
an impartial tribunal. 72
In Landman the court was troubled by the vagueness of the
prison rules. 7 Landman went so far as to hold "that the existence
of some reasonably definite rule is a prerequisite to prison discipline of any substantial sort." 74 The court found that "misbehavior, .... misconduct" and "agitation" are so vague that they
provide no fair warning that certain conduct is punishable and,
in practice, permit punishment for such protected activities as
gaining access to the courtsY On the other hand, Landman upheld such offenses as "insolence," "harassment" and "insubordination."
What appears to be developing-and it should not come as a
surprise-is an increasing judicial acceptance of the necessity for
some procedural regularity in prison discipline and a recognition
of the need to separate major from minor infractions. Except for
Landman, and a few other recent decisions, the need to announce
in advance and with reasonable precision just what conduct is
69. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
70. Id. at 780.
71. 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
72. 328 F. Supp. at 781-84. Serious punishments are indefinite confinement in the
adjustment center or segregation, punishments which may increase the sentence, any fine
or forfeiture and any type of isolation longer than ten days.
73. See also Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
74. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. at 656.
75. Id.
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subject to discipline-in effect, a Prison Penal Code-has not been
touched. There is an obvious irony in requiring certain procedural formalities without at the same time requiring some
assurance that the substance of the matter is itself constitutionally
acceptable.
Among the more troublesome aspects of the new procedural
requirements are those relating to an impartial tribunal and
representation. It is obviously necessary to disqualify the individual who reports the infraction, but how much is gained by
allowing his fellow officer or immediate superior to sit in his
stead? And, absent some sort of program which is accepted by the
prison officials, inmate representation of other inmates is loaded
with such dangers as that the inmate advocate will either curry
favor with the officials or be subject to intimidation and reprisals.
Either way, the person accused suffers. Representation by staff
carries with it similar doubts plus the additional factor of a pervasive distrust of the staff by inmates (and possibly vice-versa).
Also one wonders how a confidential relationship can be established between an inmate and a staff member in light of current
organizational arrangements. Typically, all staff members are employed by the administrative head and are required-by rule or
common practice-to report infractions. Obviously, this creates a
situation where a reasonable defense effort is in serious jeopardy.
Nonetheless, the norms of an impartial tribunal and the
need for representation have been established and, given the nature of prison life, must be counted as gains for prisoners. However, I am not prepared to hail these decisions as a veritable bill
of rights nor do I believe that their logical extension should be
so viewed. The quest for procedural fairness unquestionably is
worthy of support as well as the investment of time and energy.
Decisions like Landman, even if operationally suspect, have immense symbolic value for prison inmates. They are provided with
a new set of verbal symbols which, in turn, provide the right to
demand at least minimal justification from a system that normally reserves the right to be completely arbitrary in its exercise
of total control over those in its charge. The risks that concerned
George Bernard Shaw appear to be quite different than the risks
of procedural gains. Shaw must have been concerned with those
reformers who set out to change prison programs and convert
inmates into right thinking, upstanding citizens. Procedural re877
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formers should not believe that their goals are loftier than lifting
some of the weight of an oppressive system from the inmates and
diluting the absolute discretion of prison officials.
The struggle to expand and implement procedural due process in prison should be viewed as transitional and not be allowed
to become terminal. Even with this important limitation much
remains to be accomplished before the rights gained on paper are
likely to result in changes in official behavior. This, of course,
implies that the correction community does not greet decisions
like Landman, Bundy, and Clutchette with an embracing enthusiasm. It implies further that most prison authorities-like law
enforcement officials reacting to the Warren Court-will seek
minimal compliance and maximum avoidance when a ruling is
viewed as impairing efficiency or creating the potential for disorder. It is still true that for most wardens, a good prison is a
quiet and efficient prison.
I do not mean to leave the impression that the current era of
prisoners' rights has involved only procedural issues. Indeed,
there are several areas of prison life now under challenge that
represent a potential for change which far exceeds that which is
possible through procedural safeguards alone. Before touching on
those areas and suggesting the direction of further judicial probes,
it will be useful to recapitulate the prior discussion and add some
embellishments.
We have seen that prisoners are gaining new rights which
enable them to challenge both the type of discipline sought to be
imposed and the manner in which such decisions are reached.
This, in essence, represents the combined (and not unimportant)
gains of the expansion of procedural due process and the constitutional proscription of cruel and unusual punishments. Courts
have recognized the fundamental proposition that, at least for
procedural purposes, infractions must be divided into major and
minor categories. There is a hint that prisons will be held to a
requirement of publishing rules in advance with the subsidiary
requirement that such rules be specific and reasonable.
Reasonableness is being discussed in terms of requiring that
the rules be adopted in pursuit of a valid penal or correctional
objective. To date, the professed objectives of security and good
order have been invested with an almost magical quality. An administrator need only describe the problems of facing thousands
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of incarcerated men who may in an instant overwhelm his undertrained and overworked personnel and the point is driven home.
Linked with the emergence of a judicial perspective that the
validity of prison rules may not be self-evident is the doctrine of
the least restrictive alternative.7 Assuming that the burden may
be placed on the system to demonstrate both the validity of the
rule and that it is the least onerous means of accomplishing a
valid penological purpose, the stage is set for some very interesting interrogation. Beyond the need for security, what will a
warden answer to the question: what are your objectives?
A judicial strategy which actually required an administrator
to demonstrate the effectiveness of deterrence or institutional
treatment programs would create an impossible burden. It is
clear that we have practically no reliable studies on recidivism,
either in terms of causes or numbers. Parenthetically, we also are
unable to say-except by inferences drawn from ethical or humanitarian considerations-whether prisons with the worst internal conditions contribute more to recidivism than those with
a more humane atmosphere.7 7 The primitive state of the data
and the lack of definitive studies suggests that whoever wins the
battle over the burden of proof, wins the war.
The procedural and substantive rights previously discussed
lay the predicate for yet another possible gain-an effort to achieve
informational due process. Put more grandly, this means the
right to shape and share information which will be used to make
decisions that are vital to an inmate. A prisoner is a number and
a file and the information and conclusions that go into that file
determine the individual's future. He is diagnosed, evaluated, and
reported; he is mature or immature, maximizing or failing to
maximize his prison experience; he is ready or not yet ready for
release. As Leslie Wilkins has discussed, some words-like "immature" are lethal, having 100 percent kill when they appear in
a parole file.7 After all, release depends on maturity and there is
no immediate recovery from "immaturity."
Presumably, one of the objectives of procedural regularity in
disciplinary proceedings is to contribute to the accuracy of infor76.

Cf. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

77.

See N. MoRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CON-

TROL 115-33 (1970).
78. See Wilkins, supra note 6.
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mation in the file and the rationality of conclusions made thereafter. Thus, if an inmate receives all the due process he can
handle and the file still reflects an incident, how much has been
gained? Judge Zirpoli in Clutchette was sensitive to this issue
because of the peculiarities of the California system. 79 In California, the tie between the paroling authority and the institution
is absolutely clear. The Adult Authority sets the date for earliest
release-the functional equivalent of the minimum sentence elsewhere-and the candidate's institutional record is a major, if not
the most crucial, determinant of release on parole.
Thus, the state of the record relates to liberty in its most
pristine form. It is one thing to win the right to procedural safeguards and quite another to win the right to periodic review of
the file, the right to shape the record by additional inputs or to
dissent from what cannot be removed or even to have experts read
entirely different conclusions into the record.
While the problem of control over information and conclusions is dramatically illustrated in the California system, it exists
in every system about which I have information. Pennsylvania,
for example, without a similar sentencing structure, has exactly
the same problem. I recently observed parole hearings in the
Pennsylvania system and was given the opportunity to study the
same file used by the board member in deciding whether or not
to grant parole. In every instance, the crucial factor was the summary of the candidate's prison behavior. Violations were listed
in summary fashion and the volume of cases so great that little or
no time existed for explanation.
Fighting was considered to be a major problem, indicative of
violent propensities. Whether or not there was provocation or a
reasonable effort at self-defense simply could not be known. On
the one hand, it may be argued that a fair disciplinary proceeding
will result in an accurate record. On the other hand, with no control over what is fed into the file or the conclusions that are
drawn, even a dismissal of the prior charges may appear in the file
as evidence of a litigious troublemaker. At another level of abstraction perhaps all this merely illustrates, once again, is the inherent limitations on procedural safeguards and the decisiveness
of existing power arrangements in prison.
79. Clutchette v. Procunier, 828 F. Supp. at 777.
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The first amendment right to freedom of speech-previously
submerged in dealing with a prisoner's right of access to the
courts-has taken on an important new role. s0 The first amendment encompasses the right of the prisoner to communicate with
the outside world and the right of those outside to communicate
with the prisoner. 8 ' Judicial disapproval of mail censorship has
reached the point where one court held that outgoing mail to
attorneys and public officials cannot be opened or delayed while
incoming mail from the same parties can be opened (but not
read) to check for contraband, but only in the presence of an inmate. 2
The emergence of the first amendment in the prisoner's
rights area represents some possibilities not inherent in procedural safeguards. To the extent that the first amendment will
allow prisoners to reach the outer world with their grievances and
allow them any communicative material available to us, it will
have succeeded in piercing the isolated world of the prison. Prisons thrive on sensory deprivation, on manufacturing a total environment. Why do prison authorities express such fear about
inflammatory political tracts, racially oriented writing, sexually
explicit material, even keeping abreast of current affairs? The
answer most often given is the ubiquitous need to maintain good
order and discipline and thus determine what material might "incite and stimulate in an unhealthy manner." 83
In addition to the communicative aspects of the first amendment, prisoners are accorded the right to petition for redress of
grievances and this should be interpreted to encompass the right
to associate with each other for the purpose of bettering their
conditions, political activity and even the creation of unions.8 4
In the same fashion that a balancing of interests is used to determine what process is due, the parameters of speech and assembly
can be determined. Once again, the prison should be required to
80. See generally Note, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAr.. L. REv. 407

(1967).

81. See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D.R.I 1970).
82. Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162, 165 (D. Me. 1971).
83. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 1968).
84. See Comment, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposal for the Organizationof Inmate Labor,21 BUFFALO L. REv. 963 (1972).
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justify suppression and to demonstrate the utilization of the least
restrictive alternative.8 5
IV.

PRELIMINARY

QUESTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

The movement to bring a modicum of legal rights has been
discussed through the admittedly idiosyncratic selection of cases
and issues. In this effort I have been more concerned with the
limitations inherent in judicially imposed rules, in particular
those dealing with internal procedures, than their affirmative aspects. It now seems appropriate to turn the inquiry around and
deal in a more positive and less cautionary fashion with the rights
of prisoners.
A coherent theory of legal change in corrections should recognize both the potential and the limitations of change through
litigation. I do not propose to repeat the cautionary remarks
previously made, but wish only to underscore the necessity of
being sensitive to the problem. In addition, winning a case the
wrong way can create the possibility for disastrous consequences
in the future.
For example, to win a particular issue by a solid showing of
institutional ineffectiveness creates the strong possibility of laying
the groundwork for utilization of practices that ask to be evaluated only in terms of effectiveness. Behavioral modification programs and electronic surveillance devices are off the drawing
board and await only the failure of community-based treatment
programs.8 6 Operant conditioning and aversive suppression techniques along with electronic monitoring of an individual's behavior obviously raise the gravest sort of questions concerning
human dignity and liberty. In addition to high claims of efficiency, proponents of their adoption need only argue that offenders have very few rights now and in light of the failure of all
other techniques "we at least deserve a chance." Thus, another
caution based on estimates of the future: when the ineffectiveness
of prisons is to be used as a basis for gaining a particular legal
right, the argument should always include the proposition that
85. See Bass, Correcting the Correctional System: A Responsibility of the Legal
Profession, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 125, 149 (1971).
86. See R. SCHWITZGEBEL, DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL REGULATION OF COERCIVE BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES WITH OFFENDERS

(Pub. Health Serv. Publ. No. 2067, 1971).

PRISON REFORM

the right is necessary regardless of the failures of corrections, that
ineffectiveness is but one aspect of the argument and is raised to
rebut claims that the addition of the right will impair a program
that might otherwise succeed.
Another important issue relates to the need for. goal clarification with the corollary need for greater definitional precision
and the separation of goals from tactics. In the first instance, it is
vital to ask what are the appropriate overall objectives of the
prison reform movement and to what extent can prisoners' rights
litigation be made coordinate with those objectives?
One increasingly popular point of view is that prisons must
be abolished.8 7 Support for this position is based variously on
humanitarian or philosophical grounds, or the more pragmatic
approach that prison does not work. The latter position, of
course, assumes an understanding of the objectives of prison. If
it should be shown that prison is designed for temporary or prolonged incapacitation to be imposed in an unpleasant or even
cruel fashion, that it is aimed at nurturing the very deviance it
professes to eliminate or reduce, then prison might be said to be
a success. One can argue that the prison is a failure only if one
assumes that contemporary prisons are designed to achieve some
affirmative result.
Norman Carlson, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
recently was asked if the ultimate reform of prisons is their abolishment. He replied that from a utopian point of view that would
be a desirable objective but that, practically, there will remain
the need to incarcerate the hard core offenders who are the dangerous, assaultive types.88 Inherent in this response is the notion
that while some prisons cannot (or will not) be abolished, imprisonment for many offenders presently incarcerated can be
abolished. This, in turn, leads to the further observation that it
is a mistake, as well as a disservice to the individuals involved, to
refer to prisoners as though they were homogeneous in relevant
characteristics.
Mr. Carlson's position, as I understand it, is consistent with
that of the National Prisoners' Alliance which takes the view that
87. See, e.g., D. GREENBERG, TiHE PROBLEM OF PRISONS 3 (1970).
88. Interview with Norman Carlson, Attica: A Look at the Causes and the Future,
in 7 CRiM. L. BuLL. 817, 832 (1971).
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the immediate as well as intermediate goals of reform must be
directed at the reduction of prison populations. The reduction
position faces the obvious questions of how to decide who stays
in, for how long and for what objective. Should the reduction
position prevail-and its chances for success far exceed those of
the abolitionists-the most likely result is that prisons of the future will house the chronic offender, those who are considered to
be dangerous by virtue of a propensity toward physical violence
and possibly the political offender. s9
In addition to abolition and reduction, there is the objective
of making prisons more humane and civilized in their operation.
The thrust of my prior observations about the decisions requiring procedural reform would naturally lead the reader to conclude that one can reasonably expect little more even from a
decision as progressive as Landman.
That a Landman or Bundy or Clutchette may not do more
is not also to say that the results achieved necessarily are inconsistent with abolition or reduction. Procedural due process becomes an attractive trap when it is elevated to a primary objective
and when there is no follow-up to assure compliance. As a primary objective, it can only bring healthy pressure to bear on the
internal functioning of the prison. An appellate decision announcing a new inmate right also becomes a flag to be waved by
those who are engaged in negotiation efforts on behalf of inmates:
"a court has required this, now shall we talk?" However, if those
who achieve these victories abandon prison reform and leave
rights to exist only on paper, this could dash the hopes of those
who seek a modicum of fairness and decency from their keepers.
The limitations of procedural innovation suggest that litigation experts should be working closely both with other actionreform groups as well as a study group like the Committee for the
Study of Incarceration, commonly known as the Goodell Committee. This Committee is conducting a conceptual inquiry into
incarceration and alternatives." They are concerned with the
89. By political offender I refer to those who are prosecuted in an effort to suppress
a movement designed to achieve social and economic change. I do not mean to include
those who despite the seeming apolitical nature of their offense view themselves as political
prisoners because of the racial-class bias of the criminal justice system.
90. An aspect of the inquiry is available in an article by the Executive Director of
the Committee. See von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confine.
inent of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. Rav. 717 (1972).
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nature, purposes and utility of incarceration. Action-reform
groups abound. Those with a significant number of former inmates, like the Fortune Society, seem to be particularly relevant
to a coordinated effort.
I do not propose a coordinated effort merely to be fashionable or even democratic in appearance. Ultimately, reformers
must move beyond the critical stance and formulate alternatives
with which they can respond when the inevitable "but what is
your solution" is asked. Obviously, the validity of a criticism is
not dependent on the existence or viability of an alternative. But
it is also true that inertia takes over in the absence of some apparently workable alternative.
The point of urging coordination is a recognition of the
limitations of what lawyers know and are able to do and of the
necessity of adding the perspective of the detached scholar as well
as the experiences of those who have been consumers of correctional justice. The kind of pressure that can be brought to bear
by action groups is considerably different than the litigation enterprise or the drafting and promotion of change through legislation. Let me now return to other matters that lawyers may find
useful to litigate in the near future.
What lawyers are able to do is, of course, a function of what
courts are willing to do. It may be the right time to begin raising
cruel and unusual punishment arguments at the point of sentencing. That is, one can argue either that any confinement or, more
likely, confinement in one of the more primitive institutions is
itself a cruel and unusual punishment. 1 By raising the issue at
sentencing one may diminish the natural hesitancy of a judge to release a person already confined; additionally, for the individual
litigant, this creates sentencing options other than incarceration.
For those already confined it is possible to develop a constitutional rule of privacy based on the fourth amendment and a
liberal reading of Griswold v. Connecticut 92 and Stanley v.
Georgia.3 In both of these decisions, the Court gave high priority to the protections to be afforded a man in his home. When
an individual is sentenced to prison that is the only home he has
during his incarceration and, in rhetorical fashion, I ask why
91. Cf. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 380-81.
92. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
93.
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should he not enjoy freedom from arbitrary intrusions? The answer from corrections will be the need for security and order
which, of course, is similar to the answer of law enforcement as to
why the warrant procedure is untenable. The right to privacy
would not include the right to resist any searches or seizures. If
there is cause to believe that an inmate has a weapon or contraband, then a reasonable search could be permitted. If a truly
independent ombudsman or hearing officer is built into the disciplinary system, he might also supervise the administration of
search and seizure. Should the right to privacy be breached then,
at the least, the newly created impartial tribunal would be
required to dismiss any charges emanating from the illegal activity 4
Another tactic worthy of further exploration and use is the
suit for compensatory and punitive damages allowable under 42
U.S.C. section 1983. One case upheld as reasonable an award of
$25.00 per day for every day spent in illegal segregation." The
total award amounted to $9,300 and was deemed the personal
liability of the offending warden. Perhaps I place exaggerated
faith in the potential for altering official behavior by reducing the
generally limited cash reserves of a prison official. My suspicion,
however, is that money damages may be as effective a deterrent as
anything the courts might devise in this area.
Beyond this-and this may be beyond the scope of litigationit should be required that the correction bureaucracy announce
its stated goals, its strategies for achieving them and then regularly report (in a fashion other than the slick annual report with
pictures) on what progress has been made toward achieving
them. It seems utterly irrational to continue to confine hundreds
of thousands of men and not require that system to justify itself.
This article has approached the matter of prison reform with
both a profound distrust for prison administration and a sense of
defrd vu about current reform efforts. The litigation efforts to date
deserve credit for forcing a small opening in a system sorely in
need of ventilation.
The needling and nagging of prisoners' rights lawyers has
94. For an excellent discussion of the right to privacy in prison, see Singer, Privacy,
Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional
Aspects of the DegradationProcess in OurPrisons,21 BUFFALO L. REv. 669 (1972).

95. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204 (2d Cir. 1971).
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provided inmates with an arsenal of verbal symbols that may well
make it easier for a man to do time. No one who is on the outside
has standing to discount that.
The task now, as I see it, is to avoid the exaggeration of what
is possible through litigation, to inventory and consolidate gains
and to link up with other reform efforts-ranging from high level
study efforts to action oriented groups-and move in the direction of achieving overriding objectives. Bringing decency and
regularity to the prison should be viewed as a transitional step on
the road to the elimination of the fortress prison and the utilization of any institution as a choice of first resort. The burden of
demonstrating the viability of our prisons is on those who manage
them and it is a burden they cannot meet.

